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Abstract 
 
We design a donations vs. own money choice experiment and compare the 
results from three different treatments. In two of the treatments the pay-offs are 
hypothetical. In the first of these, a short cheap talk script was used and subjects 
were required to state their own preferences in this scenario. In the second 
treatment, subjects were asked to state how they believed the average student 
would respond to the choices. In the third treatment the pay-offs were real, 
allowing us to use the results to compare the validity of the two hypothetical 
treatments. Our hypothesis is that when subjects are asked to state how they 
believe an average person would respond, they will use their own preferences in 
their responses without using the survey situation for self-enhancement. However, 
we find a large difference in the results from both hypothetical treatments 
compared to the real money treatment. We find that the marginal willingness to 
pay for donations is higher when subjects state their own preferences but lower 
when subjects state what they believe are other people’s preferences. We also find 
that it is mainly women who are prone to these differences in the study.  
 
Keywords: Stated preferences, cheap talk, third person approach, choice 
experiment
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1 Introduction 
 
Survey questions are frequently used to elicit information on a variety of personal 
preferences. While this is relatively straightforward in most cases, there is some 
concern regarding the validity of responses in hypothetical survey settings associated 
with self-image situations such as risk, donations, and the provision of public goods. 
Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) describe donations as a ”purchase of moral 
satisfaction” and while Andreoni (1990) shows that donations to public goods may 
be due to either altruism or warm-glow (egoism) both reasons are related to a 
positive self-image motive. With this in mind, it appears likely that the hypothetical 
survey situation may provide a cheap opportunity for the respondents to enhance 
their self-image. 
One criticism against using survey questions concerns incentives for the 
truthful revelation of preferences (Carson et al. 1996). The problem is that 
respondents may not place enough emphasis on the contingent part of the survey. In 
the hypothetical set-up where no actual payment is required, subjects may tend to 
focus mainly on the benefits of the project while largely ignoring the costs. The 
survey results would then reveal the attitudes rather than the preferences of the 
respondents (Kahneman and Sugden 2005).  
A number of studies have tested the possible disparities between hypothetical 
survey responses and subjects’ responses in actual situations, in particular within the 
stated preference literature; see e.g. Bishop and Heberlein (1979), Carson et al. 
(1996) and Harrison and Rutström (2002) for studies testing hypothetical responses 
the contingent valuation method, and e.g. Carlsson and Martinsson (2001), Ding et 
al. (2005) and Lusk and Schroeder (2004) for studies testing hypothetical responses 
in choice experiments. Although findings from meta analysis studies support the 
belief that hypothetical situations lead to a higher stated WTP compared with non-
hypothetical situations, the evidence is mixed (List and Gallet 2001; Murphy et al. 
2005). 
Another line of research in the stated preferences literature focuses on ways to 
overcome or at least reduce the differences between responses given in a 
hypothetical survey situation and behavior in a real situation. One method is the use 
of cheap talk scripts where subjects are informed that a propensity to exaggerate 
stated WTP has been found in previous similar studies. Thus, by introducing the 
notion into the consciousness of the subject, the effect of a self-image bias is thought 
to be reduced. The success of cheap talk scripts has shown varied results. Using 
private goods, classroom experiments, or closely controlled field settings, the use of 
cheap talk has proven to be potentially successful (Cummings and Taylor 1999; List 
2001; Murphy et al. 2005). Similarly, short cheap talk scripts have been effective in 
reducing the marginal WTP in choice experiments (Carlsson et al. 2005). However, 
mixed results have been found when incorporating a public good with private good 
attributes (Aadland and Caplan 2003, 2006), and one explanation put forward for this 
difference is the effect of the length and structure of the cheap talk script. 
In this paper, we suggest another method that could potentially be effective in 
reducing the difference between hypothetical and real situations: the third-person 
perception approach, where we ask subjects what they believe an average person 
would do. This is analogous to the false consensus notion in social psychology, and 
implies that in many situations, people tend to believe that others think and behave 
like themselves (Fields and Schuman 1976; Ross et al. 1977). The notion behind this 
is that people will use their own preferences to predict that of others and 
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consequently state their own preferences in their responses. The assumption we make 
here is that when respondents use their own preferences as a proxy for others, they 
will not use the survey situation for self-enhancement or social desirability. In our 
experiment, the respondents made their choices anonymously, so any direct effect of 
social desirability should be small. At the same time, because subjects know that 
they are participating in an economic experiment they might feel that they are under 
scrutiny by the researcher and thus social desirability could be important (cf. Levitt 
and List 2007). Our hypothesis is that social desirability will also be less influential 
when we use the indirect question approach (cf. Fisher 1993).  
Various studies suggest that the third person approach may have potential, 
especially in situations where there is little social distance between the predictor and 
the target. For example, Epley and Dunning (2002) found in a series of experiments 
that student participants consistently tend to overstate their own generosity, but were 
relatively accurate when predicting the generosity of other students. Other studies 
have found that when predicting the risk-behavior of others, subjects tend to believe 
others have the same risk preferences as themselves (Chakravarty et al. 2005; Hsee 
and Weber 1997). Similarly, Henriksen and Flora (1999) studied the perceived 
influence of cigarette advertising on children. They found that the discrepancy 
between perceived influence on themselves and others was smaller when children 
compared themselves with their best friends than with other peers. Fisher (1993) 
found that there are differences between direct and indirect questioning when the 
issues are subject to social influence, and that indirect questioning is insensitive to 
the degree of anonymity. Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson (2006) find that people 
state that the environmental performance of cars is important for them, but not for 
their neighbors. The authors argue that this stated difference is due to a positive self-
image attained by responding to the survey. The studies that are closest to our own 
are Lusk and Norwood (2009a,b), in whose model people may derive utility from 
stating that they are willing to pay for a good due to the effects of social desirability 
or warm-glow. They also argue that a third person approach, or what they called 
inferred valuation, can mitigate this bias. In Lusk and Norwood (2009a), lab 
experiments are used where subjects vote for the provision of unique Swiss chard 
plants to everybody in the group. If more than half the group vote yes, all subjects 
receive a plant at a certain cost. If more than half vote no, the plants are destroyed. 
They find that predictions of others’ voting behavior are similar to actual voting 
behavior. Lusk and Norwood (2009b) compare three goods that vary in terms of 
people’s familiarity and social normative motivation. One of the main findings is that 
for goods with high normative consequences, own stated willingness to pay is higher 
than the predicted willingness to pay of others. 
In order to test the performance of the cheap talk and third-person perception 
approaches described above, we designed a donations vs. own money choice 
experiment using three different treatments and a between-subject comparison. The 
main reason for using a between-subject design is to avoid the risk of subjects trying 
to be consistent between the treatments that are very similar in design. In each 
treatment, the subjects were required to make 12 pair-wise choices where the 
characteristics of each choice were personal money, donation to a charity, and type 
of charity. In two of the treatments the pay-offs were hypothetical. In one of these, a 
short cheap talk script was used, and subjects were required to state their own 
preferences in this hypothetical scenario. In the second, subjects were asked to state 
how they believed an average student would respond to the choices. In the third 
treatment, the pay-offs were instead real, thereby allowing us to use the results to 
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compare the validity of the two hypothetical treatments. All three treatments were 
conducted using student respondents at Karlstad University, Sweden. 
Measuring the difference between real and hypothetical situations even in a 
specific experimental context is not without problems. Studies have shown that the 
experimental situation itself can lead to bias even if real-payoffs are involved; see for 
example Alpizar et al. (2008) and List et al. (2004). Thus, the real money treatment 
in this setting may have induced responses that are biased due to for example, self-
enhancement or social desirability effects.1 The treatment with real money in this 
experiment is not designed to exactly replicate an actual donation situation. Instead, 
it is designed to be a reference case to which the two hypothetical scenarios may be 
compared. Thus, although we cannot be sure that the real money treatment used in 
this study is the objective standard, we assume that this treatment is the one most 
closely aligned to true preferences, and for simplicity, we will denote the difference 
between the real and hypothetical treatments as hypothetical bias. Thus, this should 
not be interpreted as a belief that behavior in the real money experiment is not 
affected by contextual factors or that there are no self-enhancement effects.  
Our results find a large difference between the hypothetical and real 
treatments, where the marginal willingness to pay for donations is higher when 
subjects state their own preferences but lower when subjects state what they believe 
are other students preferences, compared with the treatment with real money. Our 
explanation is that self-image effects are at play in both cases. In the cheap talk script 
treatment, the results reveal that it is mainly women who drive the difference 
between the hypothetical and real treatment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a 
description of the experimental design and procedure. The results from the study are 
presented in section 3 followed by a discussion in section 4. 
 
2  The Experiment 
 
2.1 Experimental Design  
 
In order to test the performance of the hypothetical-cheap-talk and hypothetical-
other approaches discussed above we designed a donations vs. own money choice 
experiment using three different treatments within which subjects were required to 
make the same 12 pair-wise choices where the characteristics of each choice were 
personal money, donation to a charity and type of charity. The experiment is 
essentially a repeated pair-wise choice version of a dictator game. In each alternative 
a certain amount of money is donated to a specific charity, and a certain amount of 
money is given to the subject for his/her personal use. The charities included were 
World Wildlife Fund, UNICEF Children’s Fund and The Red Cross disaster relief. 
All these charities are well known to the subjects. The attributes, donations and 
                                           
1 There is empirical evidence that behavior in the lab involving real money does not mimic 
behavior outside the lab. For example, Shogren et al. (1999) conducted a hypothetical mail 
survey and a lab experiment concerning irradiated food, and compared the results with actual 
store purchases. They found that both the survey and the lab experiment resulted in a larger 
market share prediction of irradiated chicken than the grocery store prediction. Lusk et al. 
(2006) compare a framed field experiment with actual retail sales. They find that the results 
of the framed field experiment predict consumer behavior in the store, although there is some 
evidence of more pro-social behavior in the framed field experiment. 
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personal money had four different levels respectively; the levels of the donation were 
200, 300, 400, and 500 SEK, and the levels of personal money were 0, 20, 50, and 
100 SEK.2 A simple cyclical design or a so-called fold-over design was used. First, 
an orthogonal main effects design was generated, consisting of 12 attribute level 
combinations. These combinations represent one alternative in each set. The attribute 
levels in the second alternative were obtained by adding two levels to the attribute 
levels in the first alternative, and when the highest level was reached, we started over 
from the lowest level. Thus, a subject made in total 12 pair-wise choices. We use a 
split sample design, with three treatments. The main reason for using a split is to 
avoid the problem of subjects trying to be internally consistent in their responses 
(Ariely et al. 2003; Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter 2008). The three treatments 
used were: 
 
i) Real-Money: In this treatment the subjects made choices with real pay-offs 
to both the charity as well as themselves. They were informed that one of 
these would be randomly drawn as the actual choice set. An example of one of 
the choices in this treatment is given in Figure 1.  
 
We use the results from this treatment in order to assess the performance of the 
hypothetical approaches. 
 
ii) Hypothetical-cheap-talk: In this treatment all pay-offs are hypothetical, 
both to the subjects and to the charities. The subjects were given a short 
cheap-talk script in which they were informed, verbally, using the overhead as 
well as in the text that 
 
“Experiences from similar studies have found that peoples’ responses in a survey 
situation often differ to how they actually act in real life. It is especially common for 
people to state that they are willing to donate money to a worthy charity, but later do 
not do so.” 
 
   Choice 1. Which of the two following alternatives do you choose? 
 Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
Type of project World Wildlife Fund Unicef Childrens Fund 
Money to the project 500 SEK 300 SEK 
Money to yourself 0 SEK 200 SEK 
 
I choose  
 Alternative 1 
 Alternative 2 
Figure 1. Example choice task  
 
                                           
2 At the time of the survey 1 SEK = 0.16 USD. Due to a typing error, one choice sets with the 
level 200 SEK for own money, was instead 20 SEK. We will still include this choice set in 
the analysis.  
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We used a cheap talk script that is shorter than in many other studies, because a 
similar script has been used with good results for choice experiments (Carlsson et al. 
2005). The choice sets were exactly the same as in the real-money treatment but they 
were instead asked “Which of the two following alternatives would you choose?” 
 
iii) Hypothetical-others: In this version subjects were required to state how 
they believed an average student would respond to the choices. The choice of 
reference group is not straightforward. Our hypothesis is that subject will not 
use the experiment situation for self-enhancement and will base their answer 
on their true preferences. The social distance between the subject and the 
group should not be too great. Thus, to use for example an average citizen, 
would make it hard for the subjects to transmit her own preferences; see for 
example Hsee and Weber (1997). On the other hand, one should not choose a 
group that is too close, since there is then a risk of group-image bias; see for 
example Henriksen and Flora (1999). We believe the choice of using the 
“average student” as the reference group was a reasonable compromise. 
 
The subjects were required to answer the same choice sets as the other treatments but 
were asked the question “Which of the two alternatives would the average student 
choose?” 
The full scripts are presented in the appendix. Each respondent made a total of 
12 pair-wise choices, and these were the same in all three treatments. By comparing 
the responses in the three treatments, we can assess the performance of the two 
hypothetical treatments. Since we only observe the choices and not the preferences 
of the respondents, we apply a standard random utility model in the analysis. The 
utility of alternative i for individual k is 
 
ikkijjkik DonationV   iMoney''     (1) 
 
where, ijDonation  is the amount of money donated to project j, iMoney  is the 
amount of money the individual receives, ik  is an error term, and jk  and k  are 
parameters. In order to allow for unobserved heterogeneity we assume that the 
donation parameters jk  are randomly distributed with a normal distribution. Since 
we have repeated observations, we assume that the parameters are constant across 
choice sets for a given individual. We assume that the errors terms are normally 
distributed. The model is estimated as a random parameter logit model with 
simulated maximum likelihood using Nlogit 4.0; see Train (2003) for details on 
simulated maximum likelihood. From the utility specification in (1), we can estimate 
the marginal willingness to pay for a donation to a project; this is simply the ratio of 
the donation and money coefficients. 
 
2.2 Experimental procedure 
 
A total of 268 undergraduate students from Karlstad University took part in the 
experiments that were conducted at the beginning of a lecture. The participants 
studied courses in business administration and economics. 103 men and 165 women 
participated in seven separate experimental sessions, each of which lasted around 20 
minutes. Due to budget limitations, we were required to limit the number of subjects 
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in the treatment with real money. There were 64 subjects in the real-money 
treatment, 108 subjects in the hypothetical-cheap-talk treatment and 96 subjects in 
the hypothetical-others treatment.  
Verbal instructions with supporting overheads were used in addition to the 
written instructions in the questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of two parts, 
the choice experiment and questions regarding the respondents’ socioeconomic 
status. The responses were anonymous in all three treatments. In the Real-money 
version, the participants were given an identity number which was also printed on the 
back of the questionnaire. The session began with the experimenter explaining how 
the payment procedure guaranteed a large degree of anonymity. After the session, 
each respondent took their identity card to a room where another person, not 
involved in the study, randomly picked a number in order to establish for which of 
the twelve questions the pay-off would occur. The respondent was immediately paid 
the sum corresponding to the choice made and the corresponding donation registered 
and later paid anonymously. Although the payments were made privately, there is 
nevertheless a small risk that the knowledge that a third party would be present at the 
payment procedure might have affected subject responses.  
 
3  Results 
 
The raw data from the three different treatments for the whole sample and for the 
male and female respondents are presented in Table 1. Swedish students are a fairly 
homogenous group, therefore not many questions were asked regarding their socio-
economic characteristics. The two main characteristics that are of interest in the 
analysis are gender and whether the subjects currently contribute to charities. Using a 
proportion test for these two characteristics we find no significant differences 
between the three treatments.3 To begin with, we will focus on the results for the 
whole sample. 
The share of subjects who chose the alternative which gave them the most 
money is consistently lower in the hypothetical-cheap-talk treatments compared with 
the two other treatments. This suggests that there is a hypothetical bias in the 
treatment with a cheap-talk script. There is no consistent difference in behavior 
between the hypothetical-other and the real-money treatment, and consequently we 
need the econometric analysis to determine whether there is a hypothetical bias in the 
hypothetical-other treatment as well. 
We begin by estimating three separate models for the three different 
treatments. Table 2 reports the results of the random parameter models for the three 
treatments. All models are estimated with simulated maximum likelihood using 500 
Halton draws; see Train (2003) for details on simulated maximum likelihood. We 
also report the estimated marginal WTPs for a donation, the standard errors for 
marginal WTP are calculated with the Krinsky and Robb (1986) method with 2,000 
draws. 
                                           
3 The shares of females are 0.59, 0.58 and 0.68 in the hypothetical-other, hypothetical cheap 
talk and the real money treatment respectively. The shares of subjects currently donating to 
charities are 0.29, 0.24, and 0.31 respectively. 
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Table 1. Share of subjects who chose the alternative which gave them the most money 
 Share of subjects who chose the alternative which 
gave them the most money 
 Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Hypo-
cheap 
Hypo-
other 
Real money 
Set Project Donation Money Project Donation Money 
1 WWF 500 0 Unicef 300 200 0.57 0.93 0.73 
2 WWF 400 100 Unicef 200 50 0.54 0.61 0.73 
3 WWF 300 20 Unicef 500 100 0.79 0.84 0.95 
4 WWF 200 50 Unicef 400 0 0.31 0.51 0.36 
5 Unicef 500 100 Red Cross 300 50 0.74 0.77 0.94 
6 Unicef 400 0 Red Cross 200 200 0.42 0.79 0.59 
7 Unicef 300 50 Red Cross 500 0 0.40 0.50 0.47 
8 Unicef 200 200 Red Cross 400 100 0.38 0.59 0.55 
9 Red Cross 500 50 WWF 300 0 0.70 0.82 0.92 
10 Red Cross 400 200 WWF 200 100 0.78 0.84 0.92 
11 Red Cross 300 0 WWF 500 200 0.61 0.78 0.88 
12 Red Cross 200 100 WWF 400 50 0.37 0.57 0.45 
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Table 2. Results of random parameter models for the three treatments, p-
values in parentheses. 
 
 Hypothetical-cheap-talk Hypothetical-other Real-money 
 Coefficient 
(p-value) 
MWTP 
(s.e.) 
Coefficient  
(p-value) 
MWTP 
(s.e.) 
Coefficient  
(p-value) 
MWTP 
(s.e.) 
Random parameters 
Donation to WWF 0.0020 
(0.000) 
1.231 
(0.216) 
0.0007 
(0.000) 
0.105 
(0.031) 
0.0039 
(0.000) 
0.474 
(0.046) 
Std dev. donation to WWF 0.0022 
(0.000) 
 0.0001 
(0.998) 
 0.0039 
(0.000) 
 
Donation to Unicef 0.003 
(0.000) 
1.847 
(0.328) 
0.0017 
(0.000) 
0.260 
(0.035) 
0.0054 
(0.000) 
0.645 
(0.040) 
Std dev. donation to WWF 0.0012 
(0.000) 
 0.0001 
(0.999) 
 0.0001 
(0.703) 
 
Donation to Red Cross 0.0027 
(0.000) 
1.661 
(0.287) 
0.0017 
(0.000) 
0.261 
(0.027) 
0.0045 
(0.000) 
0.546 
(0.029) 
Std dev. donation to Red 
Cross 
0.0016 
(0.000) 
 0.0001 
(0.991) 
 0.0008 
(0.015) 
 
Fixed parameters 
Personal money 0.0016 
(0.000) 
0.0014 
(0.000) 
0.0066 
(0.000) 
   
Number of observations 1296  1152  768  
Number of individuals 108  96  64  
Pseudo R2 0.02  0.01  0.04  
 
In terms of the sign and statistical significance of the mean parameters, the three 
treatments yield similar results. However, the standard deviation parameters are 
not statistically significant in all models, indicating that we are only to a limited 
extent, capturing unobserved heterogeneity. Most importantly, the magnitude of 
the WTP is quite different across the three treatments. In the hypothetical-
cheap-talk treatment the marginal WTP for a donation varies from 1.23 SEK for 
WWF to 1.85 SEK for Unicef, which means for example that a subject states 
that they would be willing to pay 1.82 SEK in order to increase a donation to 
Unicef by 1 SEK. Thus, the model results suggest that subjects are willing to 
sacrifice more money than what is actually donated; despite the inclusion of the 
short cheap-talk script. The marginal WTP in the treatment with real money 
varies between 0.47 to 0.65 SEK. The differences in WTP between the 
hypothetical and real-money treatments are all significant, and there is thus a 
significant hypothetical bias. This result is in contrast with the earlier findings 
of Carlsson and Martinsson (2001), and Lusk and Schroeder (2004) who both 
find that choice experiments tend not to suffer from hypothetical bias for 
marginal trade-offs. Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter (2008), on the other 
hand, found a hypothetical bias for marginal WTP in a similar experiment.4 One 
should of course be careful when comparing different studies since the nature of 
the good, the sample and designs vary considerably across studies. However, 
the experiments in both Carlsson and Martinsson (2001), and Johansson-
                                           
4 One reason why Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter (2008) find a hypothetical bias, 
while Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) do not, could be that the latter use a within-
sample design, where the same respondents answer both a hypothetical and a real-
money experiment. 
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Stenman and Svedsäter (2008) are similar to our experiment. In a meta-analysis 
of hypothetical bias the hypothetical value was about 2.5-3 times the real-
money value for public goods, in choice experiments with cheap-talk scripts, 
which is in line with our results (Murphy et al. 2005).5 Our results are therefore 
also in contrast with for example Carlsson et al. (2005), who find that a short 
cheap-talk script reduced hypothetical bias, while we find no evidence of the 
same.  
The hypothetical-other treatment also results in a hypothetical bias in the 
sense of a difference in WTP compared with the real-money treatment. The 
marginal WTP in this treatment is around 0.21 SEK, which is statistically 
significantly lower than the marginal WTP in the real-money treatment. In this 
case, the bias is in the other direction, since the marginal WTP for this treatment 
is lower than the marginal WTP using real money. One explanation is that 
subjects use themselves as a reference point when evaluating others (Dunning 
and Hayes 1996), and use the survey situation to bolster their self-image and 
validate a positive sense of self by predicting the generosity of others to be less 
than their own (Dunning 1996). Thus, a respondent with an own marginal WTP 
of say 0.3 SEK, is able to enhance her own self-image by stating a lower value 
for her peers6. Our results contrast the findings of Lusk and Norwood (2009a) 
where people’s predictions about the voting behavior of others for a public good 
are similar to their own actual behavior. One explanation for the difference in 
the results is that the good used in our study, donations to charities, has stronger 
self-image effects and stronger relative self-image effects than the good used in 
Lusk and Norwood (2009a), a relatively unique plant. That is to say, it is more 
important to believe that you would donate more to charities than others, than it 
is to believe that you are more willing to protect a unique pot plant. This is 
consistent with the findings of Lusk and Norwood (2009b), where the 
difference between stated own WTP and predicted WTP of others is significant 
when the good is associated with normative motivations. However, in our 
experiment the predicted WTP of others is even significantly lower than the 
WTP from the hypothetical experiment with a cheap talk script. 
As discussed in the introduction, the critical assumption of the third-
person perception approach is that because respondents were not asked to 
explicitly state their own preferences, they would not use the survey situation as 
an opportunity for self-enhancement. However, the results of our study suggest 
that this assumption is erroneous. Research has shown that individuals who 
report attitudes and behavior for themselves and others are motivated to believe 
they possess various desirable attributes not only on an absolute level, but also 
on a relative level when compared to others (Alicke and Klotz 1995; Messick et 
al. 1985; Moore and Kim 2003). We believed that the respondents would not 
engage in such comparison as they were not explicitly asked to state their own 
preferences relative to others, but the results suggest that this was probably not 
the case. However, it is important to remember that we are comparing three 
situations where the subjects make their decisions in a laboratory. Hence they 
                                           
5 However, the total number of choice experiment studies included in Murphy et al. 
(2005) is small, and they were only able to measure the effect of hypothetical bias of 
calibration techniques in general, not only cheap talk scripts. 
6 This is of course under the premise that the responses in the real money treatment 
reflect true preferences. 
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are aware that they are being observed by a researcher. This has an effect on 
behavior, not only in the two hypothetical treatments, but also in the treatment 
involving real money. As we discussed in the introduction, there are problems 
associated with using results from laboratory experiments involving real money 
in order to predict actual behavior outside the lab; see e.g. Shogren et al. (1999), 
List et al. (2004) and Lusk et al. (2006). One explanation for this is that 
although there are self-image effects from donations in the real world, these 
may be augmented due to the laboratory situation. 
Using two-sided t-tests we can in all cases reject the hypothesis of equal 
WTP and for all models we can reject the hypothesis of equal parameters.7 
Thus, looking at the aggregate data, we see a strong indication of hypothetical 
bias in both the hypothetical-cheap-talk and the hypothetical-other treatments, 
but that they go in opposite directions. This is most likely due to strong self-
image effects.  
Considering the rank of the projects we find that the UNICEF children’s 
fund is the most preferred project for the real-money treatment, while there is 
no statistical difference between UNICEF and the Red Cross disaster relief for 
the hypothetical treatments. The WWF is least preferred in all treatments. 
 
3.1 Differences among subject groups 
 
Although students tend to be fairly homogenous with respect to observable 
characteristics, two of these characteristics may affect responses in the 
experiment: the gender of the subject and current contributions to charitable 
organizations. There is some empirical evidence that women are less egoistic 
than men (List 2004), offer more in dictator games (Eckel and Grossman 1998), 
and express more concern with the environment than men (Zelezny et al. 2000) 
although the results are mixed. There is also a recent paper that found that 
women are more prone to starting point bias in a choice experiment than men 
are (Ladenburg and Olsen 2008). In order to check for whether the subjects that 
are currently donating money to charitable organizations are more likely to have 
a higher WTP than other subjects, we estimate the random parameter logit 
models for the three treatments, where all the random parameters interact with 
two dummy variables. The first one, female, is equal to one if the subject is a 
female. The second one, donated today, is equal to one if the subject is currently 
contributing money to a charitable organization. The results are reported in 
Table 3. All models are estimated with simulated maximum likelihood using 
500 Halton draws. 
From table 3 we see that there are differences between male and female 
subjects and between those subjects who currently donate to charitable 
organizations and those that do not. Moreover, the differences between subject 
groups vary between the treatments. In order to get a clearer picture of the 
                                           
7 These are tested with likelihood ratio tests. When performing this test we need to 
account for the fact that the estimated parameters are confounded with the respective 
scale parameters. One way of dealing with this problem is to first test for a difference in 
scale between the data sets. We do this using the grid search procedure by Swait and 
Louivere (1993). Given the estimated scale parameter, one can then test the hypothesis 
of equal parameters. When estimating the random parameter model with the grid search 
procedure, 25 draws were used instead of 500. 
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differences we estimate the marginal WTP for the different subject groups; 
these are presented in Table 4. The standard errors for marginal WTP are 
calculated with the Krinsky and Robb (1986) method with 2000 draws. 
There are substantial differences between male and female responses in 
the hypothetical-cheap-talk treatment, and more importantly, differences in the 
relation between hypothetical-cheap-talk and the real-money treatment. For 
males, the marginal WTP is between 0.46 and 1.27 SEK in the hypothetical 
treatment and the difference between hypothetical-cheap-talk and real-money is 
not statistically significant using a two-sided t-test (p-values are 0.92, 0.09 and 
0.33 respectively). For females, the estimated marginal WTP is between 1.76 
and 2.3 in the -cheap-talk treatment, which means that for all charities, females 
have a substantially higher WTP. However, this is not the case for the real-
money treatment, which in turn means that there are large and significant 
differences between marginal WTPs for females. 
 
Table 3. Results of random parameter models for the three treatments, p-
values in parentheses. 
 
 Hypothetical-
cheap-talk 
Hypothetical-
other 
Real-money 
 Coeff. 
 (p-value) 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
Coeff.  
(p-value) 
Random parameters 
Donation to WWF 0.0006 
(0.067) 
0.0008 
(0.015) 
0.0047 
(0.000) 
Std dev donation to WWF 0.0022 
(0.000) 
0.0001 
(0.998) 
0.0039 
(0.000) 
Donation to Unicef 0.0018 
(0.000) 
0.0020 
(0.000) 
0.0073 
(0.000) 
Std dev donation to WWF 0.0012 
(0.000) 
0.0001 
(0.999) 
0.0001 
(0.992) 
Donation to Red Cross 0.0011 
(0.000) 
0.0020 
(0.000) 
0.0051 
(0.000) 
Std dev donation to Red Cross 0.0014 
(0.000) 
0.0001 
(0.993) 
0.0007 
(0.032) 
Fixed parameters 
Donation to WWF × Female 0.0021 
(0.000) 
0.0067 
(0.000) 
-0.0001 
(0.891) 
Donation to Unicef × Female 0.0016 
(0.000) 
0.0002 
(0.590) 
-0.0018 
(0.018) 
Donation to Red Cross × Female 0.0025 
(0.000) 
0.00001 
(0.995) 
-0.0002 
(0.700) 
Donation to WWF × Give today 0.0005 
(0.181) 
-0.00001 
(0.978) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Donation to Unicef × Give today 0.0008 
(0.039) 
-0.0008 
(0.032) 
-0.0019 
(0.037) 
Donation to Red Cross × Give today 0.0005 
(0.190) 
-0.0010 
(0.032) 
-0.0013 
(0.033) 
Personal money 0.0016 
(0.000) 
0.0010 
(0.0210) 
0.0085 
(0.000) 
Number of observations 1296 1152 768 
Number of individuals 108 96 64 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.01 0.06 
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Both groups, subjects that currently give to charitable organizations and those 
who do not, show a strong hypothetical bias as well. The difference in marginal 
WTP is significant in all six cases. 
Overall our results therefore suggest that it is the female respondents that 
drive the results of a strong hypothetical bias in the aggregate model. It is 
difficult to come up with any one single explanation to this. It cannot be the 
case that women, in this setting, care more about the good as men actually have 
a higher WTP in the real-money experiment. Additionally, we should not expect 
any large income differences between men and women in a student-sample. It 
could be that women are more socially oriented than men are, and that 
generosity and altruism is an important part of their self-image. Thus, when 
responding in the hypothetical-own treatment they may tend to overstate their 
generosity to a greater degree than men in order to conform to their own self- 
image and perhaps also the image they believe that society has of women. For 
example in a field experiment on blood donations and monetary compensation 
Mellström and Johanneson (2008) find a significant crowding out effect for 
women but not for men. They argue that this is because women are more 
concerned with social esteem than men, and that the behavior in the experiment 
is a way to signal generosity. It could also be due to differences in effects of the 
cheap talk script between men and women. The script could have been effective 
in reducing hypothetical bias for men, but not for women. 
 
 
Table 4. Marginal WTP estimates for subject groups, in SEK. 
 
  Hypothetical-
cheap-talk 
Hypothetical-other Real-money 
Males Donation to WWF 0.458 
(0.189) 
0.086 
(0.044) 
0.479 
(0.068) 
 Donation to Unicef 1.267 
(0.268) 
0.261 
(0.049) 
0.792 
(0.077) 
 Donation to Red Cross 0.759 
(0.197) 
0.261 
(0.049) 
0.561 
(0.050) 
Females Donation to WWF 1.760 
(0.334) 
0.261 
(0.039) 
0.468 
(0.046) 
 Donation to Unicef 2.223 
(0.414) 
0.261 
(0.055) 
0.581 
(0.053) 
 Donation to Red Cross 2.298 
(0.418) 
0.262 
(0.045) 
0.537 
(0.039) 
Give today Donation to WWF 1.428 
(0.315) 
0.018 
(0.054) 
0.296 
(0.077) 
 Donation to Unicef 2.144 
(0.426) 
0.151 
(0.067) 
0.489 
(0.099) 
 Donation to Red Cross 1.860 
(0.259) 
0.156 
(0.064) 
0.437 
(0.065) 
Do not give today Donation to WWF 1.107 
(0.218) 
0.141 
(0.039) 
0.546 
(0.044) 
 Donation to Unicef 1.659 
(0.302) 
0.306 
(0.044) 
0.713 
(0.046) 
 Donation to Red Cross 1.551 
(0.266) 
0.305 
(0.037) 
0.590 
(0.036) 
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Our findings are completely contrary to two previous studies on hypothetical 
bias and gender. Brown and Taylor (2000) find, using an open-ended contingent 
valuation survey on donations to the Nature Conservancy, hypothetical bias for 
both males and females. However, the hypothetical bias for males was three 
times larger than the one for females. Mitani and Flores (2007) find in an 
induced value public good game that females were more likely to reveal their 
true value than males when hypothetical payments are used. Since we get the 
opposite results, neither of the studies can be generalized. 
The difference between WTP for the hypothetical-other and the real-
money treatments is significant for both males and females, as well as for 
subjects that currently donate and those who do not donate to charitable 
organizations. Thus, our suggestion to use a third-person approach in order to 
reduce hypothetical bias has not proven to be successful in this particular 
experiment. Interestingly, those subjects who donate to charitable organizations, 
actually state an even lower marginal WTP in the hypothetical-other treatment, 
than other subjects. 
 
4.  Discussion  
 
If we accept the premise that the real money treatment is the experiment that is 
most closely aligned to true preferences then the results from the third-person 
perception approach imply that the expected false consensus effect where the 
respondents should project their own preferences on others was unsuccessful. 
Instead we may have observed a self-enhancement effect where the respondents 
derive satisfaction from favorable social comparison.  
The implication that the success of the third person perception approach 
is dependent on the normative motivations associated with the good is 
consistent with findings of Lusk and Norwood (2009b). Further, in our 
experiment the predicted WTP of others is even significantly lower than the 
WTP from the hypothetical experiment with a cheap talk script. Although we do 
not explicitly ask the respondents to state their own preferences as well, they 
may well have used their own preferences as an anchor and when predicting 
others to be less generous than themselves tip the generosity scale in their own 
favor. This better-than average-effect (Alicke and Klotz 1995), can be viewed 
as a type of self-serving bias in which people evaluate their own characteristics 
more favorably than those of others. This self-enhancement motive is central in 
the psychological downward comparison theory where people validate a 
positive sense of self by engaging in social comparison thereby obtaining 
feelings of well-being and self-esteem (Wills 1981). This effect may also have 
been augmented by the ambiguous nature of the comparison target, the “average 
student” permits a high level of subjectivity in the comparison process thereby 
allowing respondents more latitude to select downward comparison targets 
(Alicke and Klotz 1995; Perloff and Fetzer 1986; Weinstein 1980). 
Kahneman and Sugden (2005) discuss the risk that survey questions may 
elicit responses that reflect attitudes rather than preferences. While this is a 
problem usually associated with open-ended contingent valuation surveys, the 
results from the hypothetical own treatment confirm this risk even for choice 
experiments. The higher marginal WTP for the hypothetical own treatment 
compared to the other treatments reflects that own money has less influence on 
the observed choices and that donated money and the choice of project play a 
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much more important role in the decision. Since the participants apparently 
contemplate less over own money, their responses appear to reflect attitudes 
rather than preferences between donated and own money. One reason for this 
attitude effect is probably the self-enhancement obtained from donations. This 
problem is especially apparent for female respondents in our survey, which is 
actually contrary to two previous studies (Brown and Taylor 2000; Mitani and 
Flores 2007). Coupled with the fact that we have quite a small student sample 
one should be cautious with generalizing the results and further, it indicates the 
need for further studies that consider differences between men and women with 
respect to hypothetical bias. 
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Appendix 1  Experimental instructions 
Hypothetical-cheap-talk 
In this part of the survey we are interested in finding out how people regard different types 
of charities and donations to the same. We will present you with twelve different choice 
situations, each of which has two alternatives. Please use a cross to mark the alternative you 
would prefer if you found yourself in this situation. Each alternative has three 
characteristics.  
 
 Type of project:  
There are three possible projects 
 
o The Red Cross Disaster Relief (Postal giro account 90 08 00 – 4).  
Donations are sent as relief aid to disaster areas.  
 
o UNICEF Children’s Fund (Postal giro account 90 20 01-7). 
Donations are sent to children in need around the world. 
 
o World Wildlife Fund (Postal giro account 90 19 74-6). 
Donations are used for the protection of endangered species of animals, 
plants and the conservation of natural environments. 
 
 Money given to the project:  
The sum of money we will donate to the given project. 
 
 Money given to you:  
The sum of money you receive from us, with which you are free to do as you wish. 
 
 
Your choice will influence how we would distribute the money between yourself and the 
charity as well as the type of charity that will receive the money. 
 
For each of the choice situations below, we wish you to state which alternative you would 
choose if you were faced with the choice. Regard each question as a new situation.  
 
Experiences from similar studies have found that peoples’ responses in a survey situation 
often differ to how they actually act in real life. It is especially common for people to state 
that they are willing to donate money to a worthy charity, but later do not do so. 
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Hypothetical-other 
In this part of the survey we are interested in finding out how people regard different types 
of charities and donations to the same. We will present you with twelve different choice 
situations where each situation has two alternatives. Please use a cross to mark the 
alternative you believe the average student would choose if faced with the situation. Each 
alternative has three characteristics.  
 
 Type of project:  
There are three possible projects 
 
o The Red Cross Disaster Relief (Postal giro account 90 08 00 – 4).  
Donations are sent as relief aid to disaster areas.  
 
o UNICEF Children’s Fund (Postal giro account 90 20 01-7). 
Donations are sent to children in need around the world. 
 
o World Wildlife Fund (Postal giro account 90 19 74-6). 
Donations are used for the protection of endangered species of animals, 
plants and the conservation of natural environments. 
 
 Money given to the project:  
The sum of money we will donate to the given project. 
 
 Money given to the person:  
The sum of money the person making the choice will receive from us, with which 
he/she is free to do as they wish. 
 
 
A person can through his/her choices influence how the money is distributed between 
himself and the charity as well as which charity will receive the money. 
 
For each choice situation below, we wish you to state which alternative you believe the 
average student would choose if faced with the choice. Regard each question as a new 
situation.  
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Real-money 
In this part of the survey we are interested in finding out how people regard different types 
of charities and donations to the same. We will present you with twelve different choice 
situations where each situation has two alternatives. Please use a cross to mark the 
alternative you choose. Each alternative has three characteristics.  
 
 Type of project:  
There are three possible projects 
 
o The Red Cross Disaster Relief (Postal giro account 90 08 00 – 4).  
Donations are sent as relief aid to disaster areas.  
 
o UNICEF Children’s Fund (Postal giro account 90 20 01-7). 
Donations are sent to children in need around the world. 
 
o World Wildlife Fund (Postal giro account 90 19 74-6). 
Donations are used for the protection of endangered species of animals, 
plants and the conservation of natural environments. 
 
 Money given to the project:  
The sum of money donated by us to the given project. 
 
 Money given to you:  
The sum of money you receive from us, with which you are free to do as you wish. 
 
 
You can influence through your choices how the money is distributed between yourself and 
the charity as well as which charity will receive the money. 
 
For each choice situation below, we wish you to state which alternative you choose. Regard 
each question as a new situation as payment will be made only on one of the twelve 
questions.  
 
After the session, one of the choice situations will be chosen randomly by drawing a number 
between 1 and 12. You will receive payment directly in accordance with your choice of 
alternative. The charity in the alternative you have chosen will also receive the money stated 
in the alternative.  
